












only	 statements,	 including	 medical	 reports	 and	 other	 documents,	 by	
parties	 and	 witnesses	 who	 have	 submitted	 to	 full	 and	 live	 cross-
examination.	 	This	approach	departs	sharply	from	both	the	due	process	
requirements	 and	 practices	 for	 public	 school	 student	 discipline	 and	
administrative	hearings,	and	the	rules	for	admissibility	of	evidence	in	civil	
and	even	criminal	trials.		An	analysis	of	the	evidentiary	standards	under	
the	 new	 regulations	 identifies	 a	 myriad	 of	 issues	 that	 are	 not	 clearly	
resolved.	 	Some	issues	are	addressed	but	not	authoritatively	resolved	by	
non-binding	 agency	 guidance;	 many	 other	 issues	 remain	 unsettled	 or	






future	 modification,	 which	 apparently	 will	 begin	 with	 proposed	 new	
regulations	in	May	2022,	the	new	regulations’	approach	to	the	admission	
of	evidence	 is	evaluated	using	the	 lens	of	the	agency’s	stated	goals:	due	
process	 and	 fairness	 for	 respondents,	 equal	 treatment	 of	 complainants	
and	respondents,	the	centrality	of	credibility	assessment,	and	the	reality	












statements.	 	 The	 ban	 fetishizes	 cross-examination	 to	 assess	 credibility	
while	 ignoring	 other	 common	 and	 important	 impeachment	 techniques.		
Its	adoption	is	part	of	a	conspicuous	pattern:	the	new	regulations	borrow	
general	evidentiary	approaches	from	the	rules	for	trial,	and	then	modifies	




admit	 hearsay	 against	 criminal	 defendants.	 	 The	 new	 regulations	 also	
create	a	rape	shield	barring	evidence	of	complainant	sexual	history	and	




history	 information	 to	 the	 respondent	 prior	 to	 the	 hearing.	 	 There	 are	
fairer	and	better	alternatives	that	are	appropriate	to	the	nature	of	school	
hearings	with	 non-attorney	 decision-makers.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 normal	
approach	 in	 school	hearings	and	administrative	hearings	 is	 to	 focus	on	
weight	 rather	 than	 admissibility;	 admitting	 almost	 all	 evidence,	 while	




























































































Title	 IX1	 prohibits	 gender	discrimination	by	 schools	 that	 receive	
federal	education	funds.		Sexual	harassment,	including	but	not	limited	
to	 sexual	 assault	 (hereinafter	 collectively	 referred	 to	 as	 “sexual	
misconduct”),	 is	 a	 form	 of	 gender	 discrimination	 and	 has	 been	 the	
subject	 of	much	 litigation	 and	 guidance	 from	 the	 U.S.	 Department	 of	
Education	(“DOE”).2	 	However,	neither	Title	 IX’s	statutory	 text	nor	 its	













Longstanding	 Title	 IX	 regulations	 require	 schools	 to	 offer	 an	
internal	 grievance	 process	 for	 Title	 IX	 complaints	 generally	 that	
provides	 “prompt	 and	 equitable”	 resolution.4	 	 Similarly,	 longstanding	
regulations	 under	 the	 Clery	 Act,5	 which	 applies	 to	 certain	 offenses	
covered	 by	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations,6	 require	 “prompt,	 fair,	 and	
impartial”	hearings.7		The	new	Title	IX	regulations	establish	a	novel	and	
specific	 process	 for	 schools	 to	 follow	 when	 responding	 to	 formal	
complaints	 of	 sexual	 misconduct.8	 	 Schools	 must	 investigate	 formal	
complaints	and	share	 the	evidence	gathered	 in	 the	 investigation	with	
the	parties.9		At	the	college	level,	the	complaint	is	resolved	in	a	formal	
adversarial	 hearing	 conducted	 in	 accordance	 with	 specific	 rules	 of	
evidence.10	 	The	agency	explains	that	its	new	process	and	the	rules	of	
evidence	focus	on	providing	due	process11	and	fundamental	fairness	for	



















	 11	 See	 infra	 Section	 III.B.	 	 Notably,	 the	 procedural	 requirements	 apply	 equally	 to	
private	schools,	against	whom	students	do	not	have	constitutional	due	process	rights.	
	 12	 Along	these	lines,	treatment	of	a	complainant	or	respondent	may	be	actionable.		
34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(a)	 (“[R]ecipient’s	 treatment	 of	 a	 complainant	 or	 a	 respondent	 in	
response	to	a	formal	complaint	of	sexual	harassment	may	constitute	discrimination	on	





or	 against	 complainants	 or	 respondents	 generally	 or	 an	 individual	 complainant	 or	
respondent.”).	 	 Training	materials	 “used	 to	 train	Title	 IX	Coordinators,	 investigators,	
decision-makers,	and	any	person	who	facilitates	an	informal	resolution	process,	must	










evidence	 in	 college	 hearings.	 	 In	 particular,	 schools	must	 exclude	 all	
statements	made	by	parties	 and	witnesses	who	do	not	 submit	 to	 full	
cross-examination	 at	 the	 hearing	 as	 to	 evidence	 used	 to	 determine	
responsibility.15	 	 The	 new	 approach	 departs	 significantly	 from	 other	

















examined	 statements	 arbitrary	 and	 capricious	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 Administrative	
Procedure	Act	(APA),	Victim	Rts.	L.	Ctr.	v.	Cardona,	No.	20-cv-11104,	2021	WL	3185743,	
at	*16	(D.	Mass.	 July	28,	2021).	 	The	court	 later	clarified	that	 it	was	vacating	the	ban	
generally,	and	not	only	with	regard	to	the	parties.		Order,	Victim	Rts.	L.	Ctr.	v.	Cardona,	
No.	 20-cv-11104	 (D.	 Mass.	 Aug.	 10,	 2021),	 https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/massachusetts/madce/1:2020cv11104/222276/186/0.pdf.		Most	recently,	the	
DOE	issued	a	guidance	letter	indicating	it	would	not	administratively	enforce	the	ban.		











pursuant	 to	APA	 requirements	 that	 the	 regulatory	process	 include	a	 concise	 general	
statement	of	regulations’	basis	and	purpose,	5	U.S.C.	§	553(c),	and	they	are	published	in	
the	 Federal	 Register.	 	 Hence,	 some	 commentators	 suggest	 they	 may	 be	 the	 most	
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pages,18	 and	 subsequent	 non-binding	 guidance	 documents	 from	 the	
enforcing	agency.19		This	analysis	identifies	relevant	guidance	from	the	





them.21	 	 President	 Biden	 issued	 an	 Executive	 Order	 directing	 their	
review,22	 and	 the	 agency	 announced	 its	 intent	 to	 publish	 proposed	
revised	regulations	in	May	2022.23		Any	end	will	almost	certainly	not	be	
quick.		The	same	years-long	notice-and-comment	process	used	to	enact	
regulations	 is	 required	 to	 repeal	 or	 revise	 them.24	 	 And	 one	 cannot	
predict	or	know	whether	the	new	regulations	will	be	wholly	reworked	
or	 amended	 in	more	modest	ways.	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 announced	
intent	 to	 amend,	 Part	 III	 of	 this	 Article	 evaluates	 the	 evidentiary	
approach	under	the	current	regulations	using	the	lens	of	the	agency’s	
goals	 for	 its	 new	 process:	 due	 process	 and	 fairness	 for	 respondents,	





	 19	 See	 OFFICE	 FOR	CIVIL	RIGHTS,	Questions	 and	 Answers	 Regarding	 the	 Department’s	
Final	Title	IX	Rule,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Educ.	(Sept.	4,	2020)	[hereinafter	2020	Q	&	A],	https://





Educ.	 (Jan.	 15,	 2021)	 [hereinafter	2021	Q	&	A	 Part	 II],	 https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-titleix-part2-20210115.pdf;	OFFICE	 FOR	CIVIL	RIGHTS,	Questions	
and	 Answers	 on	 the	 Title	 IX	 Regulations	 on	 Sexual	 Harassment	 (July	 21,	 2021)	
[hereinafter	 2021	 Q	 &	 A	 Part	 III],	 https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/202107-qa-titleix.pdf.		There	are	also	OCR	blogs	on	some	other	general	issues.	See	
OFFICE	 FOR	 CIVIL	 RIGHTS	 BLOG,	 https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/blog
/index.html	(last	visited	Oct.	2,	2021).	
	 20	 This	 overview	 and	 analysis	may	 serve	 as	 a	 resource	 for	 persons	who	 become	
involved	 in	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	 formal	 complaint	 process	 as	 Title	 IX	 Coordinators	 and	
investigators,	hearing	decision-makers,	parties,	and	party	advisors.	





of	 Sex	 in	 Education	 Programs	 or	 Activities	 Receiving	 Federal	 Financial	 Assistance	
(2021),	 https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=


















rape	 shield	 to	 protect	 complainant	 sexual	 history	 and	 character	
modeled	 on	 the	 approach	 for	 criminal	 trials.	 	 The	 new	 Title	 IX	 rape	




respondent	 prior	 to	 the	 hearing.25	 	 The	 new	 system	 is	 purportedly	
justified	by	the	nature	of	school	hearings	and	the	 limited	expertise	of	
non-attorney	decision-makers.		The	reality	is	that:	(1)	the	new	system	
actually	 assumes	 Title	 IX	 hearing	 decision-makers	 will	 have	 great	
expertise,	even	to	the	point	of	providing	live	reasoning	for	any	rulings	
to	exclude	evidence,	which	is	not	required	of	trial	judges;	and	(2)	there	
exist	 appropriate	 and	 fairer	 alternatives	 to	 the	 ban	 on	 uncross-
examined	statements	and	the	specifics	of	the	rape	shield.		For	example,	
school	 and	 administrative	 hearings	 normally	 focus	 on	 weight	 rather	




















Schools	 must	 investigate	 formal	 Title	 IX	 complaints	 of	 sexual	
misconduct	and	are	responsible	for	gathering	evidence.28		The	Preamble	
recognizes	 that	 schools	 do	 not	 have	 subpoena	 powers	 to	 obtain	
evidence.29		Moreover,	the	new	regulations	create	a	right	to	abstain	from	
participation	 in	 investigations	 and	 hearings,30	 so	 schools	 apparently	
cannot	enforce	personnel	or	student	rules	that	require	participation	by	
their	 employees	 or	 students.	 	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 an	 investigation,	
schools	must	 give	 the	parties	notice	of	 the	 allegations	with	 sufficient	
detail	and	advance	notice	to	prepare	for	a	voluntary	initial	interview.31		
The	 parties	 are	 also	 free	 to	 seek	 and	 offer	 their	 own	 evidence,	 and	
schools	cannot	limit	them	in	doing	so.32	
The	 parties	 can	 agree	 to	 an	 informal	 resolution	 at	 any	 point.33		
Otherwise,	colleges	can	either	dismiss	formal	complaints	for	a	variety	of	
reasons34	or	conduct	a	private	live	evidentiary	hearing	with	a	different	













	 34	 Complaints	 that	 assert	 sexual	 misconduct	 not	 covered	 by	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	
regulations,	 such	 as	 misconduct	 occurring	 outside	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 or	 much	 sexual	
misconduct	that	occurred	off-campus,	must	be	dismissed	but	can	be	processed	under	












As	 evidence	 for	 the	 hearing	 or	 other	 resolution	 process,	 school	




reports,	 the	parties’	 social	media,	 relevant	 video	or	other	 recordings,	
and	other	evidence.37		Schools	may	want	to	put	a	sort	of	litigation	hold	
on	 the	 parties’	 school	 records,	 both	 to	 preserve	 evidence	 for	 the	
investigation	and	hearing,	and	to	avoid	spoliation	claims	in	the	event	of	
later	litigation.		At	the	hearing,	the	parties,	through	their	advisors,	have	
a	 right	 to	 cross-examine	 witnesses,	 including	 impeachment	 of	
credibility,38	 which	 is	 performed	 by	 the	 advisors	 to	 the	 parties,39	 so	




































rely	on	 it	 in	 the	hearing,	and	not	 limited	 to	evidence	 the	 investigator	
thinks	is	relevant.44		The	parties	must	have	at	least	ten	days	to	respond	
to	 this	 evidence.45	 	 Comments	 on	 the	 new	 regulations	 during	 their	
proposed	 stage	note	 this	provides	 the	parties	with	an	opportunity	 to	
strategically	add	prejudicial	information.46		
While	 the	 new	 regulations	 themselves	 do	 not	 address	 this,	 the	
Preamble	indicates	that	schools	may	require	parties	and	advisors	to	sign	
non-disclosure	 agreements	 about	 the	 evidence.47	 	 The	 Preamble	 also	
indicates	 the	 investigator	 may	 redact	 information,	 including	 FERPA-
protected	 personally	 identifiable	 information,48	 that	 is	 not	 “directly	
related	to	the	allegations,”	and	barred	information,	such	as	privileged	
information.49	 	 At	 this	 stage,	 the	 investigator	 cannot	 redact	 evidence	
seemingly	made	irrelevant	and	inadmissible	in	the	hearing	by	the	new	
regulations’	 rape	 shield.50	 	 The	 Preamble	 indicates	 that	 unlawfully	
 




would	 allow	 the	 improper,	 and	 potentially	 widespread,	 sharing	 of	 confidential	
information	 and	 incentivize	 respondents	 to	 ‘slip	 in’	 prejudicial	 information	 to	
undermine	the	process.”).	
	 47	 Id.	 at	 30,304	 (“Recipients	 may	 require	 parties	 and	 advisors	 to	 refrain	 from	
disseminating	 the	evidence	 (for	 instance,	by	 requiring	parties	and	advisors	 to	 sign	a	
non-disclosure	agreement	that	permits	review	and	use	of	the	evidence	only	for	purposes	
of	the	Title	IX	grievance	process),	thus	providing	recipients	with	discretion	as	to	how	to	










to	 the	 allegations	 (or	 that	 is	 otherwise	 barred	 from	 use	 under	 §	 106.45,	 such	 as	
information	protected	by	a	legally	recognized	privilege,	or	a	party’s	treatment	records	
if	 the	 party	 has	 not	 given	 written	 consent)	 contained	 within	 documents	 or	 other	
evidence	that	are	directly	related	to	the	allegations,	before	sending	the	evidence	to	the	
parties	for	inspection	and	review.”).	





As	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 parties	may	 gather	 their	 own	 evidence	without	
limitation,52	 and	 may	 ask	 the	 school	 to	 gather	 specific	 additional	
evidence.		Parties	and	advisors	also	have	a	right	to	access	the	school’s	









may	 need	 to	 inform	 parents	 of	 possible	 sexual	misconduct	 involving	
their	 child	 so	 that	 they	 can	 exercise	 their	 rights.58	 	 The	 agency	
contemplates	that	if	FERPA	does	not	provide	access	rights	to	the	parent	
(for	 example,	 a	 minor	 college	 student	 who	 has	 thereby	 become	 the	
holder	of	FERPA	rights	but	is	not	yet	a	legal	adult),	the	parent	who	filed	






final	 regulations	 require	 a	 recipient	 to	violate	 State	 law.	 	 If	 a	 recipient	knows	 that	 a	
recording	is	unlawfully	created	under	State	law,	then	the	recipient	should	not	share	a	











or	 evidence	 that	 is	 relevant,	 because	 §	 106.45(b)(5)(vii)	 requires	 the	 investigative	












formal	 complaint.60	 	 If	 a	 parent	 or	 the	 Title	 IX	 Coordinator	 files	 the	
formal	 complaint,	 the	 Preamble	 suggests	 the	 student	 remains	 the	
complainant	and	has	access	to	the	evidence	and	investigative	report.61		







school	 gathers	 evidence	 “directly	 related	 to	 the	 allegations”	 and	
therefore	must	be	shared	with	the	parties,64	it	is	“directly	related”	to	the	
complainant	and	respondent.65		The	agency	reasons	it	is	thus	the	FERPA	
record	 of	 each	 of	 them,	 and	 each	 has	 a	 right	 of	 access.66	 	 In	 fact,	 the	
Preamble	asserts	the	parties	would	have	a	FERPA	right	of	access	even	
without	 the	 new	 regulations.67	 	 Notably,	 under	 this	 theory	 FERPA’s	
















	 67	 Id.	 at	 30,432	 (“Even	 if	 these	 final	 regulations	 did	 not	 exist,	 parties	 who	 are	
















disclosure	 agreements.71	 	 The	 Preamble	 also	 suggests	 disclosures	 or	
statements	that	are	defamatory,	invasive	to	privacy,	or	retaliatory	(such	
as	witness	tampering)	are	not	permitted.72		Moreover,	a	new	regulation	






opening	 or	 closing	 statements,	 and	 set	 reasonable	 time	 limits	 for	
hearings.74		
1.		The	Decision-Maker	
The	 decision-maker	 cannot	 be	 the	 investigator,	 nor	 the	 school’s	
Title	IX	Coordinator.75		The	decision-maker	need	not	be	an	attorney,	and	
often	 will	 be	 an	 employee	 of	 the	 school.	 	 Decision-makers	 must	 be	
trained	 on	 relevance	 and	 other	 evidentiary	 matters,76	 and	 rule	 on	
admissibility	 of	 evidence.77	 	 Recent	 non-binding	 guidance	 from	 the	
agency	suggests	that	the	Title	IX	Coordinator	can	play	a	limited	role	in	
 
	 71	 See	 id.	at	30,304	(“Recipients	may	require	parties	and	advisors	 to	refrain	 from	






106.30,	must	 apply	 equally	 to	 both	 parties.”).	 	Where	 advisors	 or	 parties	 are	 school	
employees,	FERPA	bars	re-disclosure.	 	See	also	Preamble,	supra	note	2,	at	30,422–23	
(“The	 Department	 does	 not	 interpret	 Title	 IX	 as	 either	 requiring	 recipients	 to,	 or	
prohibiting	 recipients	 from,	 using	 a	 non-disclosure	 agreement,	 as	 long	 as	 such	 non-
disclosure	 agreement	 does	 not	 restrict	 the	 ability	 of	 either	 party	 to	 discuss	 the	
allegations	 under	 investigation	 or	 to	 gather	 and	 present	 relevant	 evidence	 under	 §	














the	 hearing	 to	 maintain	 order	 and	 facilitate	 procedurally,	 but	
evidentiary	issues	must	be	reserved	to	the	decision-maker.78	
2.		The	Parties	
Unlike	 some	 agencies	 that	 investigate	 administrative	 complaints	
and	 then	 prosecute	 cases	 for	 complainants,79	 or	 schools	 that	 present	
disciplinary	cases	against	students,80	the	school	does	not	advocate	for	
the	complainant	in	a	Title	IX	hearing.	 	As	discussed	above,	the	parties	
are	 normally	 the	 complainant	 and	 respondent,	 even	 if	 the	 Title	 IX	
Coordinator	signed	the	formal	complaint.		Whether	or	not	a	complainant	







have	 not	 chosen	 a	 private	 advisor.83	 	 The	 Preamble	 suggests	 that	
advisors	need	not	be	 impartial,	 and	 schools	are	not	 required	 to	 train	










examination)	determine	whether	a	question	 is	 relevant	 (and	explain	any	decision	 to	
exclude	a	question	as	not	relevant)	before	a	party	or	witness	answers	a	question.”).	
















Respondents	 must	 be	 presumed	 innocent.86	 	 Schools	 cannot	







that	 for	 faculty	 respondents.89	 	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 school’s	 faculty	
handbook,	 staff	 collective	 bargaining	 agreement,	 or	 tenure	 contract	









	 86	 34	C.F.R.	§	106.45(b)(1)(iv)	 (Grievance	process	must	 “[i]nclude	a	presumption	
that	 the	 respondent	 is	 not	 responsible	 for	 the	 alleged	 conduct	until	 a	 determination	
regarding	 responsibility	 is	 made	 at	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 grievance	 process.”).	 	 No	




	 87	 2021	Q	&	A	Part	 II,	supra	note	19,	at	9–10	(“The	Title	IX	regulations	prohibit	a	
recipient	 from	 imposing	 ‘any	 disciplinary	 sanctions	 or	 other	 actions	 that	 are	 not	
supportive	measures	 as	defined	 in	34	C.F.R.	 §	106.30,	 against	 a	 respondent’	without	


























indicates	 that	 direct	 examination	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 advisors.96	 	 The	
Preamble	 indicates	 that	 schools	 have	 discretion	 as	 to	 who	 conducts	
direct	examination.97	 	Schools	may	want	to	enact	rules	providing	that	
only	advisors	may	conduct	direct	examination,	to	prevent	parties	from	









§	106.45(b)(5)(vii),	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	parties	 are	prepared	 for	 a	hearing	or,	 if	 no	
hearing	is	required	or	otherwise	provided,	that	the	parties	have	the	opportunity	to	have	
their	views	of	the	evidence	considered	by	the	decision-maker,	the	decision-maker	will	
need	 to	 have	 the	 investigative	 report	 and	 the	 parties’	 responses	 to	 same,	 prior	 to	
reaching	 a	 determination	 regarding	 responsibility,	 but	 the	 timing	 and	 manner	 of	








from	considering.	 	(For	 instance,	 the	regulations	preclude	a	recipient	 from	using	in	a	
Title	 IX	 grievance	 process	 information	 protected	 by	 a	 legally	 recognized	 privilege,	 a	





ways:	 providing	 that	 advisors	 do	 not	 represent	 parties,	 providing	 that	 parties	 may	
prevent	advisors	from	asking	their	own	questions	and	limit	advisors	to	asking	questions	














respondents’	 names	 but	 allow	 release	 when	 permitted	 by	 FERPA.100		
Recent	nonbinding	guidance	 from	 the	agency	 indicates	 that	names	of	
respondents	 found	 responsible	 cannot	 be	 publicly	 disclosed	 for	
retaliatory	reasons.101	
C.		Admissibility	of	Evidence	at	the	Hearing	
The	parties	may	not	be	 limited	 in	presenting	evidence,	 including	
expert	 witnesses.102	 	 The	 Preamble	 indicates	 that	 schools	may	 enact	
rules	 of	 decorum	 to	 “forbid	 badgering	 a	witness”	 or	 to	 “prohibit	 any	
party	 advisor	 or	 decision-maker	 from	 questioning	 witnesses	 in	 an	
abusive,	 intimidating,	 or	 disrespectful	 manner.”103	 	 Schools	 should	

















	 102	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(5)(iii)	 (Recipients	 must	 not	 restrict	 parties’	 ability	 “to	
gather	 and	 present	 evidence.”);	 Preamble,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 30,432	 (“These	 final	
regulations	do	not	allow	a	Title	 IX	Coordinator	to	restrict	a	party’s	ability	 to	provide	
evidence.		If	a	Title	IX	Coordinator	restricts	a	party	from	providing	evidence,	then	the	
Title	 IX	Coordinator	would	be	violating	 these	 final	 regulations	 and	may	even	have	 a	
conflict	 of	 interest	 or	 bias,	 as	 described	 in	 §	 106.45(b)(1)(iii).”);	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	
106.45(b)(5)(ii)	 (Schools	 must	 “[p]rovide	 an	 equal	 opportunity	 for	 the	 parties	 to	








admissible	 evidence	 in	 Title	 IX	 hearings.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 non-
binding	 Preamble	 purports	 to	 resolve	 some	 issues	 at	 least	 partially.		
Further	 complicating	 matters,	 schools	 are	 forbidden	 from	 adopting	

















same	 approach	 seems	 appropriate	 here,	 with	 the	 caveat	 that	 some	
decision-maker	 reasoning	may	constitute	actionable	evidence	of	bias.		
The	 requirement	 for	 contemporaneous	 reasoning	when	 a	 question	 is	
 
	 104	 Preamble,	supra	note	2,	at	30,336–37.	
	 105	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(1)(ii)	 (requiring	 “an	 objective	 evaluation	 of	 all	 relevant	





	 109	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(6)(i)	 (“Before	 a	 complainant,	 respondent,	 or	 witness	
answers	 a	 cross-examination	 or	 other	 question,	 the	 decision-maker(s)	 must	 first	










excluded	 as	 irrelevant	would	 seem	 to	 incentivize	 decision-makers	 to	
find	questions	relevant.		A	finding	of	relevance	avoids	the	requirement	









issue	 in	 the	 hearing,	 such	 as:	 whether	 and	 what	 sexual	 misconduct	
happened;	 witness	 credibility;	 the	 impact	 of	 any	 misconduct	 on	 the	
complainant,	 such	 as	 mental	 trauma,	 physical	 injury,	 or	 academic	
difficulty;	 and	 what	 sanctions	 or	 remedies	 might	 be	 appropriate).		
Alternatively,	 Title	 IX	 relevance	 might	 reasonably	 be	 interpreted	 as	
“practical”	relevance115	as	in	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	Rule	403	(what	











the	 other	 admitted	 evidence),	 but	 does	 not	 endorse	 a	 marginal	
relevance	 approach	 more	 generally.	 	 The	 Preamble	 reasons	 that	
decision-makers	 in	 Title	 IX	 hearings	 are	 generally	 not	 attorneys	 and	
thus	 are	 unfamiliar	 with	 evidence	 rules	 for	 trials.118	 	 The	 agency’s	
guidance	is	consistent	with	understanding	the	decision-maker	to	be	a	


















The	Preamble	also	 indicates	 that	schools	cannot	enact	rules	 that	
make	 categories	 of	 evidence	 inadmissible,	 offering	 examples	 of	 lie	
detector	test	results	and	rape	kits.119		The	Preamble	suggests,	however,	
that	the	






Perhaps,	 for	 example,	 a	 school	 could	 adopt	 a	 rule	 that	 notes	 the	
unreliability	 of	 lie	 detector	 test	 results	 and	 their	 subsequent	










	 121	 See	 generally	CHRISTOPHER	B.	MUELLER	&	LAIRD	C.	KIRKPATRICK,	FEDERAL	EVIDENCE	 §	




















banned	 from	 non-consensual	 access	 to	 treatment	 records	 of	 non-
parties—such	 as	 treatment	 records	 of	 pattern	 witnesses,	 	 other	
witnesses	 such	 as	 friends	 of	 the	 parties—as	 perhaps	 bearing	 on	 the	
credibility	 of	 the	 parties,124	 or	 to	 establish	 a	 pattern	 of	 sexual	
misconduct	by	the	respondent.	 	As	discussed	above,	the	school	shares	
the	evidence	gathered	with	the	parties	and	advisors.		Thus,	when	a	party	
consents	 to	 release	 of	 treatment	 records,	 normally	 both	 parties	 and	
their	advisors	will	have	full	access	to	those	records.125	
Since	schools	are	forbidden	from	non-consensually	accessing	party	
treatment	 records,	 it	 seems	 that	 such	 records	will	 not	 commonly	 be	
offered	 in	 the	 hearing.	 	 But	 it	 is	 possible	 treatment	 records	 will	 be	
available	because	the	opposing	party	independently	accessed	them,	or	
a	party	consented	to	disclosure,	or	a	school	 investigation	erroneously	
included	 them.	 	 Portions	 of	 available	 party	 treatment	 records	 may	




the	 case	 of	 privilege,	 whether	 a	 privilege	 exists	 and	 whether	 it	 was	
waived	may	need	to	be	decided.		
Moreover,	 to	 the	 extent	 a	 party	 treatment	 record	 contains	




	 123	 The	 Preamble	 suggests	 schools	 must	 comply	 with	 state	 and	 federal	 laws	
concerning	treatment	records.		Preamble,	supra	note	2,	at	30,434	(“Medical	records	may	
be	subject	to	other	Federal	and	State	laws	that	govern	recipients,	and	recipients	should	




	 124	 The	 new	 regulations	 require	 an	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 witnesses,	
including	 attacking	 credibility.	 	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(6)(i)	 (“At	 the	 live	 hearing,	 the	























and	 no	 inference	 from	 failure	 to	 testify	 could	 be	 drawn.132	 	 The	 new	
regulations	 include	 this	 bar	 on	 inferences	 from	 failure	 to	 testify,133	
which	 is	 the	 approach	 in	 criminal	 but	 not	 civil	 trials.134	 	 Where	 the	
contours	of	the	relevant	federal	and	state	privilege	differ	(perhaps,	for	
example,	 about	 which	 “therapist”	 credentials	 qualify	 for	 the	
privilege),135	 the	 regulations	 provide	 no	 guidance	 on	which	 privilege	
 
	 128	 See	infra	Section	II.C.3.	






	 132	 Preamble,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 30,352	 (“As	 discussed	 above,	 we	 have	 revised	 §	
106.45(b)(6)(i)	to	direct	a	decision-maker	who	must	not	rely	on	the	statement	of	a	party	
who	has	not	 appeared	or	 submitted	 to	 cross-examination	not	 to	draw	any	 inference	
about	 the	 determination	 regarding	 responsibility	 based	 on	 the	 party’s	 absence	 or	
refusal	to	be	cross-examined	(or	refusal	to	answer	other	questions,	such	as	those	posed	

















a	 federal	 privilege	 (since	 these	 hearings	 are	 conducted	 pursuant	 to	
federal	statute)	or	a	privilege	of	the	applicable	state	(which	may	include	
additional	 privileges,	 such	 as	 physicians-patients	 and	 journalists-
confidential	 sources).	 	 Moreover,	 and	 as	 with	 the	 approach	 for	
relevance,	since	the	decision-maker	 is	often	not	an	attorney,	a	hyper-
technical	 approach	 does	 not	 seem	 realistic	 or	 appropriate.	 	 The	
privileges	 most	 likely	 at	 issue	 regarding	 evidence	 at	 these	 hearings	
seem	 to	 be	 attorney-client	 and	 related	 work	 product	 privileges,	
therapist137	 and	 physician138	 privileges,	 and	 the	 constitutional	 Fifth	
Amendment	privilege	against	self-incrimination.		Occasionally,	a	party	
may	claim	the	clergy	privilege,	the	journalist	privilege,	or	one	of	the	two	








IX	 case,	 a	 federal	 court	 found	 that	 attorney-client	 privilege	 had	 been	




was	 no	 privacy	 in	 school	 emails,	 amounted	 to	 a	 waiver	 of	 any	
privilege.142			























physician	 privileges.144	 	 State	 law,	 however,	 may	 add	 further	
confidentiality	 requirements	 to	 these	 records.145	 	 Also,	






understood	 that	 the	 sharing	waives	 the	privilege),	 such	 as	deliberate	
sharing	 of	 otherwise	 privileged	 treatment	 records;	 (2)	 inadvertent	
disclosure	 (for	 example,	 during	 formal	 discovery	 prior	 to	 litigation,	
accidentally	sharing	privileged	information	with	the	other	party);	and	
(3)	 implied	waiver	 (for	 example,	 suing	 for	medical	 and	mental	 harm	
damages	 sustained	 in	 a	 car	 accident	 likely	 waives	 privilege	 as	 to	
relevant	 medical	 and	 therapy	 records,	 respectively).	 	 Generally,	 the	
scope	of	the	waiver	is	not	a	blanket	one,	but	instead	is	limited	either	to	















Daggett,	 Female	 Student	 Patient	 “Privacy”	 at	 Campus	 Health	 Clinics:	 Realities	 and	











The	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations	 create	 a	 rape	 shield149	 for	
complainants	 modeled	 on	 the	 approach	 to	 criminal	 trials	 under	 the	
federal	evidence	rule.150	 	This	provision	renders	most	evidence	of	 the	
complainant’s	 sexual	 history	 and	 sexual	 character/disposition	
irrelevant	and	thus	inadmissible	in	the	hearing.	 	The	rape	shield	does	











	 149	 34	C.F.R.	 §	106.45(b)(6)(i)	 (Regarding	grievance	hearings	 in	higher	education:	
“Questions	and	evidence	about	the	complainant’s	sexual	predisposition	or	prior	sexual	
behavior	are	not	relevant,	unless	such	questions	and	evidence	about	the	complainant’s	
prior	 sexual	 behavior	 are	 offered	 to	 prove	 that	 someone	 other	 than	 the	 respondent	
committed	 the	 conduct	 alleged	by	 the	 complainant,	 or	 if	 the	questions	 and	evidence	
concern	specific	incidents	of	the	complainant’s	prior	sexual	behavior	with	respect	to	the	
respondent	 and	 are	 offered	 to	 prove	 consent.”);	 id.	 §	 106.45(b)(6)(ii)	 (grievance	
adjudication	procedures	in	K-12	schools).	
	 150	 See	FED.	R.	EVID.	412	(creating	an	exception	for	constitutionally	required	evidence,	
such	 as	 prior	 false	 allegations	 of	 sexual	 assault	 by	 the	 victim,	 or	 a	 motive	 to	 label	




exchange	 provision	 in	 §	 106.45(b)(5)(vi)	 negates	 the	 rape	 shield	 protections	 in	
§106.45(b)(6)(i)–(ii).		As	noted	by	the	Supreme	Court,	rape	shield	protections	generally	
are	designed	to	protect	complainants	 from	harassing,	 irrelevant	 inquiries	 into	sexual	
behavior	at	trial.”).	
	 153	 34	C.F.R.	 §	106.45(b)(6)(i)	 (Regarding	grievance	hearings	 in	higher	education:	
“Questions	and	evidence	about	the	complainant’s	sexual	predisposition	or	prior	sexual	
behavior	are	not	relevant,	unless	such	questions	and	evidence	about	the	complainant’s	
prior	 sexual	 behavior	 are	 offered	 to	 prove	 that	 someone	 other	 than	 the	 respondent	
committed	 the	 conduct	 alleged	by	 the	 complainant,	 or	 if	 the	questions	 and	evidence	
concern	specific	incidents	of	the	complainant’s	prior	sexual	behavior	with	respect	to	the	
respondent	 and	 are	 offered	 to	 prove	 consent.”);	 id.	 §	 106.45(b)(6)(ii)	 (grievance	
adjudication	procedures	in	K-12	schools).	
	 154	 The	 rape	 shield	 approach	 in	 civil	 trials	 was	 not	 adopted.	 	 See	 FED.	 R.	 EVID.	
















consensual	 sexual	 contact	 with	 the	 defendant	 as	 rape	 (perhaps	 to	
preserve	 the	 victim’s	marriage	 or	 other	 relationship).	 	 The	Preamble	




rape	 shield	 can	 be	 waived.	 	 Thus,	 the	 rape	 shield	 arguably	 bars	
admission	of	parts	of	some	treatment	records.	 	For	example,	even	if	a	
student	complainant	shared	details	of	sexual	history	in	counseling	and	





including	 the	 respondent’s	 sexual	 assault	 or	 harassment	 of	 other	
persons,	 who	 may	 testify	 as	 pattern	 witnesses.	 	 This	 approach	 also	
mirrors	federal	rules	of	evidence	for	trials,	which	expressly	make	some	




to	 evidence	 concerning	 “a	 victim,”160	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations	
reference	“the	complainant.”161	
 















While	 the	 Clery	 Act	 allows	 statements	 in	 hearings	 that	 are	 not	
cross-examined,162	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations	 provide	 that,	 at	 the	
college	 level,	 statements	of	 persons	who	do	not	 submit	 to	 live	 cross-
examination	at	the	hearing	must	be	excluded:	“If	a	party	or	witness	does	
not	 submit	 to	 cross-examination	 at	 the	 live	 hearing,	 the	 decision-
maker(s)	must	 not	 rely	 on	 any	 statement	 of	 that	 party	 or	witness	 in	
reaching	a	determination	regarding	responsibility.”163			
One	 federal	 trial	 court	 found	 this	 complete	 “ban”	 on	 uncross-
examined	statements	to	be	arbitrary	and	capricious	in	violation	of	the	
Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA).164		Subsequently,	the	DOE	issued	a	
non-binding	 guidance	 letter	 indicating	 it	 will	 not	 administratively	
enforce	the	ban,165	and	so	it	seems	that	DOE	will	not	include	the	ban	in	
its	present	 form	in	the	proposed	revised	regulations	 it	plans	to	 issue.		
Schools	may	choose	to	revise	their	Title	IX	policies	to	allow	some	or	all	
cross-examined	statements.		Schools	can	do	so	without	worry	that	DOE	




This	 ban	 explicitly	 applies	 to	 both	 parties	 and	 nonparty	
witnesses.166	 	 As	 a	 result,	 either	party	 can	prevent	 their	 interview	or	





	 163	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(6)(i)	 (providing	 also	 that	 “the	 decision-maker(s)	 cannot	
draw	an	inference	about	the	determination	regarding	responsibility	based	solely	on	a	





(D.	 Mass.	 Aug.	 10,	 2021),	 https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/massachu-
setts/madce/1:2020cv11104/222276/186/0.pdf.	








witnesses.167	 	 Some	 witnesses	 may	 be	 unavailable	 to	 testify	 at	 the	
hearing;	their	statements	would	also	be	excluded.		As	discussed	above,	
the	new	regulations	provide	that	inferences	may	not	be	drawn	from	a	
failure	or	refusal	 to	submit	 to	cross-examination.168	 	According	to	 the	
Preamble,	this	ban	cannot	be	waived	by	agreement	of	the	parties.169		The	
Preamble	suggests	that	witnesses	are	not	required	to	answer	questions	
posed	 by	 the	 decision-maker,	 and	 a	 witness’s	 failure	 to	 answer	 a	




does	 not	 appear	 to	 bar	 evidence	 offered	 regarding	 sanctions	 against	
respondents	found	responsible,171	nor	to	the	impact	of	misconduct	on	
the	 victim	 as	 relevant	 to	 determine	 appropriate	 remedies	 for	 the	
complainant.	 	 Less	 clear	 is	 whether	 it	 applies	 to	 the	 impact	 of	
misconduct	on	the	victim	to	determine	whether	the	misconduct	caused	
denial	 of	 equal	 access	 to	 the	 educational	program.172	 	 For	 example,	 a	
complainant’s	 academic	 transcript	 showing	 a	 decline	 in	 grades	
coinciding	with	misconduct	seems	relevant	to	both	academic	remedies	
and	 whether	 misconduct	 caused	 denial	 of	 equal	 access	 to	 the	
educational	program,	and	as	to	the	latter,	is	likely	subject	to	the	ban.	
ii.		“Submitting”	to	Cross-Examination		
The	Preamble	 indicates	 that	a	party	advisor	might	decide	not	 to	
cross-examine	a	witness;	 only	 an	opportunity	 to	do	 so	 is	 required.173		
 
	 167	 Cf.	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.71	 (defining	 prohibited	 retaliation	 to	 include	 school	










	 173	 Preamble,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 30,349	 (“Probing	 the	 credibility	 and	 reliability	 of	
statements	asserted	by	witnesses	 contained	 in	 such	evidence	 requires	 the	parties	 to	
have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 witnesses	 making	 the	 statements.	 	 The	
Department	 appreciates	 the	 opportunity	 to	 clarify	 here	 that	 to	 ‘submit	 to	 cross-
examination’	means	answering	those	cross-examination	questions	that	are	relevant;	the	







opposing	 party	 indicates	 that	 they	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 cross-examine.		
Otherwise,	“submitting”	is	undefined.		Two	primary	issues	here	include:	
(1)	 witnesses	 who	 willingly	 answer	 questions	 but	 assert	 a	 (real	 or	
feigned)	lack	of	memory,	and	(2)	witnesses	who	answer	most	questions	






to	 lack	 of	memory,	 guidance	 from	 case	 law	 involving	 these	 issues	 in	
trials	 may	 be	 helpful.	 	 For	 example,	 under	 federal	 evidence	 rules	
governing	hearsay	in	trials,	a	witness	is	not	“unavailable”	when	they	are	
willing	to	answer	questions,	even	if	most	of	the	witness’s	answers	report	





create	 limits	 on	 what	 is	 actually	 hearsay,	 as	 well	 as	 several	 dozen	
 
excluded.”)	(emphasis	added	and	omitted	from	original);	2020	Q	&	A,	supra	note	19,	at	9	
(“Thus,	 the	 decision-maker	 is	 obligated	 to	 ‘permit’	 each	 party’s	 advisor	 to	 ask	 all	
relevant	 questions.	 	However,	 this	 provision	provides	 only	 an	 ‘opportunity’	 for	 each	
party	 (through	 an	 advisor)	 to	 conduct	 cross-examination;	 this	 provision	 does	 not	
purport	 to	 require	 that	 each	party	 conduct	 cross-examination	or	will	 conduct	 cross-
examination	 to	 the	 fullest	 extent	 possible.	 	 If	 a	 party	 chooses	 not	 to	 conduct	 cross-
examination	of	another	party	or	witness,	that	other	party	or	witness	cannot	‘submit’	or	










party’s	 or	 witness’s	 statements	 cannot	 be	 relied	 on	 by	 the	 decision-maker.”).	 	 See	
Preamble,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 30,349	 (“[T]he	 Department	 declines	 to	 allow	 a	 party	 or	
witness	to	 ‘waive’	a	question	because	such	a	rule	would	circumvent	the	benefits	and	











Evidence	 for	 trials	 also	make	 the	 statements	of	 opposing	parties	 and	
their	 agents	 and	 co-conspirators	 admissible	 nonhearsay180	 on	 the	









criminal	 defendants,	 the	 Constitution’s	 Confrontation	 Clause	 limits	
admission	of	certain	hearsay.184		The	new	Title	IX	regulations	reject	this	
approach.	 	 Title	 IX’s	 unprecedented	 and	 complete	 ban	 on	 uncross-
examined	 statements	 in	 hearings	 exists	 despite	 the	 lack	 of	 power	 of	
schools,	 parties,	 and	 advisors	 to	 subpoena	 witnesses	 for	 cross-



















Court’s	 past	 and	 current	 approach	 to	 the	 Confrontation	 Clause);	 Crawford	 v.	






The	 scope	 of	 the	 Title	 IX	 hearing	 ban	 on	 uncross-examined	
“statements”	 is	 not	 certain.	 	 “Statements”	 under	 the	 Federal	 Rules	 of	






they	 made	 themself	 shake	 and	 cry	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 expressing	 a	
message.		The	Preamble	suggests	that	“statement”	should	be	used	in	its	
ordinary	sense	and	would	not	include	behavior	not	intended	to	express	
a	 message.187	 	 For	 example,	 the	 Preamble	 indicates	 that	 a	 video	








clock,	 or	 an	 automated	 store	 receipt	 dated	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 alleged	




The	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	 for	 trials	 also	 exclude	 statements	
that	 are	 offered	 for	 purposes	 other	 than	 truth	 from	 hearsay.190	 	 For	
example,	 if	 a	 witness	 testifies	 they	 saw	 the	 respondent	 harass	 the	
complainant	at	a	basketball	game,	repetition	at	trial	of	a	statement	by	
someone	who	was	present	 at	 the	game	 that	 they	 saw	no	harassment	
would	be	admissible	 in	court	 for	the	nontruth	purpose	of	 impeaching	
 
	 186	 FED.	R.	EVID.	801(a).	












the	 first	witness	with	evidence	 that	 contradicts	 their	 testimony.	 	The	
new	Title	IX	regulations	do	not	address	this	issue.		On	the	one	hand,	the	
ban	 on	 uncross-examined	 statements	 is	 phrased	 absolutely.	 	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations	 require	 opportunities	 to	
impeach	and	emphasize	the	importance	of	assessing	credibility,	and	the	
agency	might	characterize	such	statements	as	not	factual	assertions	and	
thus	 outside	 of	 the	 ban.191	 	 The	 emphasis	 on	 credibility	 evidence	
arguably	 supports	 admission	 of	 uncross-examined	 statements	 for	
impeachment	purposes.		It	is	difficult,	however,	to	keep	the	purposes	of	
evidence	separate.		In	the	example	above,	it	is	difficult	not	to	consider	
the	 statement	 of	 the	 second	 witness	 as	 evidence	 of	 its	 truth	 (no	
harassment	occurred	at	 the	basketball	game),	 for	which	purpose	 it	 is	
completely	 barred	 unless	 the	 second	 witness	 submits	 to	 cross-
examination.		
b.		Hearsay	Exceptions	












records	 are	 admissible	 only	 if	 the	 maker(s)	 submit(s)	 to	 live	 cross-








	 195	 Preamble,	supra	note	2,	at	30,349	(“Thus,	police	 reports,	 SANE	reports,	medical	
reports,	and	other	documents	and	records	may	not	be	relied	on	 to	 the	extent	 that	 they	
contain	the	statements	of	a	party	or	witness	who	has	not	submitted	to	cross-examination.		
While	documentary	evidence	such	as	police	reports	or	hospital	records	may	have	been	
gathered	during	 investigation	and,	 if	directly	related	to	the	allegations	 inspected	and	






includes	 “statements”	 of	 many	 persons,	 such	 as	 the	 faculty	 who	
submitted	the	individual	grades	recorded	on	the	transcript.		It	may	be	
that	 each	 faculty	 member	 must	 be	 willing	 to	 submit	 to	 cross-
examination	to	admit	the	transcript.		Yet,	as	it	is	only	the	opportunity	to	
cross	that	is	required,	a	workaround	might	be	to	make	a	record	at	the	











Clause	 requirements	 when	 hearsay	 is	 admitted	 against	 criminal	
defendants.197		
The	 Preamble	 mentions	 wrongful	 procurement	 of	 absence,	
indicating	that	schools	“must	remedy”	 this	retaliation,	and	suggesting	
schools	 could	 do	 so	 by	 rescheduling	 the	 hearing	 after	 taking	 safety	
precautions.198	 	 The	 Preamble	 does	 not	 address	 admissibility	 of	
evidence	 in	 this	 situation.	 	 Again,	 there	 are	 arguments	 both	 for	 and	
against	 admission.	 	 The	 ban	 on	 statements	 without	 opportunity	 for	
cross-examination	 is	 phrased	 absolutely.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
regulation	 on	 retaliation199	 clearly	 bans	 interference	 with	 witness	




In	 criminal	 trials,	 the	 Confrontation	 Clause	 operates	 as	 a	
constitutional	 bar	 on	 prosecutor	 admission	 of	 “testimonial”	 hearsay	
against	 criminal	 defendants	 unless	 there	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	 cross-
examination.200	 	 Testimonial	 hearsay	 is	 a	 statement	 made	 for	 the	
 









primary	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 facts	 for	 use	 in	 later	 proceedings.201		
While	Title	IX	hearings	are	not	criminal	proceedings,	statements	made	
to	 the	 investigator	 during	 a	 Title	 IX	 investigation	 arguably	 are	
“testimonial.”	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 party	 or	witness	 statement	 to	 a	
friend	 or	 parent	 about	 what	 happened	 is	 not	 testimonial	 and	 is	 not	
constitutionally	barred	in	a	criminal	prosecution,	even	if	there	was	no	
opportunity	 to	cross-examine.202	 	Moreover,	 the	Confrontation	Clause	
has	exceptions,	notably	 including	 the	statements	of	defendant	parties	
and	 their	 agents	 and	 co-conspirators,	 and	 situations	 where	 the	
defendant’s	 misconduct	 caused	 the	 witness’s	 unavailability	 for	
testimony	and	cross-examination.203	 	The	new	Title	 IX	 regulations	do	
not	 adopt	 this	 approach.	 	 As	 comments	 on	 the	 proposed	 regulations	
noted,	 much	 evidence	 that	 would	 be	 admissible	 in	 a	 criminal	
prosecution	 of	 a	 respondent	 is	 not	 admissible	 in	 the	 school	 Title	 IX	
hearing.204		The	Preamble	recognizes	this	reality	as	well.205	
v.		Impact	of	the	Ban	
Inadmissibility	 of	 uncross-examined	 evidence	 likely	 makes	
proving	or	defending	responsibility	quite	difficult	 for	 the	parties	and,	
given	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 burden	 of	 proof,	 especially	
challenging	 for	complainants.206	 	 If	a	respondent	confessed	outside	of	
the	hearing	and	then	refused	to	submit	to	live	cross-examination	at	the	
hearing,	 their	 confession	 must	 be	 excluded.207	 	 This	 creates	 many	
strategic	options	for	respondents,	for	example	to:	“further	a	disruptive	










48	 (D.	Mass.	 July	28,	2021)	 (“When	 .	.	.	 the	 school	has	elected	 to	apply	 the	 clear	and	
convincing	 evidence	 standard	 given	 the	 ‘high	 stakes	 and	 potentially	 life-altering	












evidence	 or	 even	 to	 persuade	 other	 witnesses	 not	 to	 attend	 the	
hearing.”208	 	 It	 also	 suggests	 an	 approach	 for	 respondents’	 attorneys:	
“No	attorney	worth	her	salt,	recognizing	that—were	her	client	simply	
not	 to	 show	 up	 for	 the	 hearing—an	 ironclad	 bar	 would	 descend,	
suppressing	any	inculpatory	statements	her	client	might	have	made	to	
the	police	or	third	parties,	would	hesitate	so	to	advise.”209		Similarly,	a	









Cross-examination	 questions	 to	 impeach	 witnesses	 are	 clearly	
relevant.211	 	The	Preamble	notes	that	impeachment	of	witnesses	must	
be	permitted:	“the	decision-maker(s)	must	permit	each	party’s	advisor	
to	 ask	 the	 other	 party	 and	 any	 witnesses	 all	 relevant	 questions	 and	
follow-up	 questions,	 including	 those	 challenging	 credibility.”212	 	 The	
new	regulations	ban	one	method	of	credibility	assessment	by	decision-
makers;	they	may	not	evaluate	credibility	due	to	a	witness’s	status,	such	




(a	 witness	 may	 have	 reason	 not	 to	 offer	 impartial	 testimony;	 for	
example,	an	eyewitness	for	the	complainant	or	an	alibi	witness	for	the	
respondent	may	be	a	friend,	or	an	expert	witness	may	have	ideological	
bias	 or	 a	 party	 has	 paid	 them	 for	 their	 testimony);	 (2)	 capacity215	 (a	
witness’s	 ability	 to	 perceive	 or	 remember	 is	 limited;	 for	 example,	 an	













their	 eyeglasses,	 or	was	 intoxicated);	 (3)	 contradiction	of	 a	witness’s	




inconsistent	 statements	 by	 the	 witness217	 (the	 witness	 told	 a	 story	
shared	 outside	 of	 the	 hearing—perhaps	 in	 the	 school	 interview,	 in	 a	
police	 statement,	 or	 talking	 to	 a	 friend—that	 is	 different	 from	 their	













not	 address	 extrinsic	 impeachment	 evidence.	 	Given	 the	 focus	on	 the	
importance	of	challenging	credibility,	the	low	standard	of	relevance,	and	
the	 mention	 in	 the	 Preamble	 of	 admission	 of	 character	 evidence	 in	





decision-makers	 will	 often	 not	 be	 attorneys,	 the	 importance	 of	
credibility,	 and	 the	 low	 standard	 for	 relevance,	 it	 would	 not	 seem	
appropriate	to	import	these	extrinsic	evidence	format	limits	into	Title	
IX	hearings.	












cross-examination.	 	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 a	 witness’s	
perjury	conviction,	or	a	document	reporting	a	friend	of	a	party	was	told	
a	 	 story	 by	 a	 party	 that	 differs	 from	 the	 party’s	 testimony,	would	 be	
barred	if	the	declarant	(the	judge	issuing	the	conviction	or	the	friend,	
respectively)	did	not	submit	to	live	cross-examination.		The	competing	
arguments	 include	 the	 absolute	 ban	 on	 statements	made	 by	 persons	
who	do	not	submit	to	cross-examination,	that	evidence	offered	solely	to	
impeach	 is	 not	 a	 statement	 offered	 for	 its	 truth	 and	 is	 thus	 arguably	




questions	 designed	 to	 enhance	 a	 witness’s	 credibility	 can	 be	 asked	
before	 that	 witness’s	 credibility	 has	 been	 attacked.	 	 The	 rules	 of	





The	 new	 regulations	 note	 the	 parties’	 right	 to	 present	 expert	
witnesses,223	 who	 in	 trials	 are	 allowed	 to	 offer	 opinions	 on	 a	 wide	
variety	 of	 subjects.	 	 The	 school	might	 identify	 some	 experts,	 such	 as	
police	officers,	in	its	investigation;	a	party	might	independently	identify	




opinions	 about	 general	 matters,	 such	 as	 reliability	 of	 eyewitness	
identification	or	perhaps	markers	of	veracity	or	deception.226		The	new	
















negligence	 case,	 evidence	 that	 the	 defendant	 is	 a	 poor	 driver	 or	 had	
prior	accidents	is	inadmissible	to	show	the	driver	drove	negligently	at	
the	time	of	the	accident.		Courts	generally	regard	the	logical	relevance	
of	such	evidence	as	 low	and	 its	potential	 for	unfair	prejudice	as	high.		
The	new	Title	 IX	 regulations	address	certain	sexual	history	character	
evidence	 with	 the	 rape	 shield	 and	 the	 admissibility	 of	 prior	 sexual	
misconduct	by	the	respondent.228		The	new	regulations	are	silent	about	
character	 evidence	 generally,	 but	 the	Preamble	 suggests	 that	 schools	
may	not	make	rules	banning	character	evidence	and	also	suggests	that	
character	evidence,	including	prior	bad	acts,	is	admissible.229		Certainly	
the	 respondent’s	 character	 is	 relevant	 to	 what	 sanctions	 may	 be	
appropriate	 if	 found	responsible.	 	The	Preamble	suggests	 the	parties’	
character	 is	 admissible	 more	 generally	 as	 to	 both	 responsibility	








The	 rules	 of	 evidence	 for	 trials	 also	 greatly	 limit	 the	 format	 for	
character	 evidence.232	 	 Generally,	 the	 rules	 allow	 character	witnesses	











id.	 at	30,337	 (noting	 that	 character	evidence	may	go	 to	witness	 credibility);	cf.	 id.	 at	








In	 school	 proceedings,	 agency	 hearings,	 and	 trials,	 parties	 may	
stipulate	 as	 to	 facts.234	 	 The	new	 regulations	 and	Preamble	 are	 silent	
about	 stipulation	 generally.	 	 As	 to	 uncross-examined	 statements	
specifically,	 the	Preamble	suggests	that	 there	can	be	no	waiver	of	 the	
requirement	 of	 submitting	 to	 cross-examination,235	 implying	 that	 the	
parties	 could	not	waive	 the	opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	of,	 for	
example,	 a	 therapist	who	 prepared	 a	 report	 about	 a	 party.	 	 In	 some	
circumstances,	however,	a	workaround	might	be	to	make	a	record	at	the	













The	 new	 Title	 IX	 regulations	 explicitly	 provide	 that	 they	 do	 not	
require	 schools	 to	 deprive	 persons	 of	 their	 due	 process	 rights.237	 	 Of	
course,	 parties	 to	 Title	 IX	 hearings	 in	 public	 schools	 are	 due	 some	




otherwise	 inadmissible	 evidence,	 such	 as	 an	 uncross-examined	
statement.		In	an	older	case,	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	held	that	a	criminal	













for,	 even	 if	 the	 confession	 is	 not	 otherwise	 admissible	 under	 the	
evidence	 rules.239	 	 A	 respondent	 might	 argue	 a	 due	 process	 right	 to	
introduce	a	third	party	confession	to	the	sexual	misconduct	at	issue	in	
the	 Title	 IX	 hearing,	 even	 if	 the	 third	 party	will	 not	 submit	 to	 cross-
examination.		
On	due	process	more	generally,	complainants	might	argue	that	the	
new	 regulations’	 complete	 ban	 on	 uncross-examined	 statements—
coupled	with	the	lack	of	subpoena	power	to	compel	witnesses	to	appear	
and	 submit	 to	 cross-examination	 and	 the	 high	 burden	 of	 proof—
amounts	to	a	violation	of	their	due	process	rights.		One	of	the	lawsuits	
challenging	the	new	regulations	argues	that	this	combination,	in	light	of	






to	argue	 the	weight	 that	 a	decision-maker	 should	accord	 to	admitted	


























Schools	 must	 offer	 internal	 hearing	 appeals	 on	 at	 least	 some	
grounds,	 including	 a	 “[p]rocedural	 irregularity	 that	 affected	 the	
outcome	of	the	matter,”245	new	evidence	not	available	at	the	hearing	that	
“could	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	matter,”246	 and	 bias,	 from	 a	 Title	 IX	
Coordinator,	investigator,	or	decision-maker,	toward	a	party	or	toward	
respondents	or	complainants	generally	“that	affected	the	outcome	of	the	
matter.”247	 	 Thus,	 a	 party	 might	 appeal	 admissibility	 rulings	 as	
procedural	regularities	or	bias	that	affected	the	outcome.		Recent	non-
binding	 guidance	 from	 the	 agency	 suggests	 that	 parties	 may	 pursue	
appeals	even	after	their	enrollment	or	employment	ends.248	
3.		Non-Title	IX	Litigation	
Parties	 in	 public	 college	 Title	 IX	 hearings	 might	 claim	 that	
admissibility	 rules	 or	 rulings	 in	 their	 hearings	 violated	 their	 due	
process,	 equal	protection,	or	other	 constitutional	 rights.249	 	Parties	 in	






fairness	 for	 respondents251	 given	 the	 serious	 consequences	 of	 being	
found	 responsible	 for	 sexual	 misconduct;252	 the	 need	 to	 treat	
complainants	and	respondents	equally;253	the	importance	of	credibility	
assessment,	 specifically	 through	 the	 crucible	 of	 live	 cross-
examination;254	 and	 the	 reality	 that	 schools	 are	 not	 courtrooms	 and	
decision-makers	in	hearings	are	neither	trained	judges	nor	attorneys.255		
Often	these	policies	are	in	tension	with	one	another,	limiting	their	ability	

















agency’s	 own	 public	 policy	 goals.	 	 One	 court	 found	 that	 the	 ban	 on	
uncross-examined	 statements,	 in	 combination	with	 other	 protections	
for	 respondents,	 “render	 the	most	 vital	 and	 ultimate	 hallmark	 of	 the	










offered	 for	 a	 nontruth	 purpose	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 ban	 on	 uncross-
examined	 statements,258	 whether	 and	 under	 what	 circumstances	




are	 not	 addressed.	 	 Reviewing	 the	 new	 regulations’	 varied	 policy	
underpinnings	 often	 counsels	 different	 and	 inconsistent	 admissibility	
standards.261	 	 Similarly,	 Title	 IX	 admissibility	 standards	 in	 some	
respects	are	modeled	on	the	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	for	trials	and	in	
other	 respects	are	not.	 	But	 the	agency	 is	 clear	 that	 it	does	not	 think	
















	 261	 Other	 examples	 of	 this	 inconsistency	 include	 what	 are	 banned	 hearsay	











is	 an	 unprecedented	 deviation	 from:	 (1)	 normal	 practices	 and	public	
school	 due	 process	 requirements	 for	 school	 discipline	 generally	 and	
Title	IX	specifically,	(2)	the	new	regulations’	approach	for	K-12	school	
formal	complaints,	(3)	the	practice	in	administrative	hearings,	(4)	the	








guarantee	 a	 right	 to	 attend	 school,	 and	 so	 student	 suspension	 or	
expulsion	 involves	 a	 deprivation	 of	 a	 property	 right.266	 	 In	 higher	
education,	there	is	no	abstract	legal	right	to	attend	a	public	college,	but	
admission	and	payment	of	tuition	may	create	a	property	right.		Injury	to	
reputation	 is	 not	 facially	 a	 due	 process	 liberty	 deprivation.267	 	When	
reputation	is	damaged,	accompanied	by	concrete	consequences	such	as	






















tell	 their	 side.273	 	The	student	has	no	 right	 to	hear,	present,	or	 cross-
examine	witnesses.274		The	Court	found	a	liberty	deprivation	involved	in	
student	corporal	punishment,	but	held	that	post-punishment	tort	claims	
offer	 sufficient	 due	 process,	 and	 hence	 pre-punishment	 rudimentary	
due	process	is	not	required.275		The	Court	noted	that	“[h]earings—even	




larger	 magnitude	 given	 the	 longer	 exclusion	 from	 school).	 	 The	
consensus	 of	 the	 lower	 courts	 is	 that	 an	 evidentiary	 hearing	 is	
required.277	 	While	 some	 courts	 found	 that	 due	 process	 requires	 the	


































At	 the	 college	 level,	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 found	 that	 cross-
examination	and	an	evidentiary	hearing	 is	not	 required	 for	 academic	
discipline281	 but	 has	 not	 addressed	 cross-examination	 or	 other	 due	
process	 requirements	 for	 misconduct	 discipline.	 	 In	 an	 academic	
discipline	case,	the	Court	noted	that	“[t]he	educational	process	is	not	by	
nature	 adversar[ial]”282	 and	 declined	 to	 “formalize	 the	 academic	
dismissal	process	by	requiring	a	hearing.	.	.	.	 [and]	further	enlarge	the	
judicial	 presence	 in	 the	 academic	 community	 and	 thereby	 risk	
deterioration	 of	 many	 beneficial	 aspects	 of	 the	 faculty-student	
relationship,”283	 suggesting	 some	 reluctance	 to	 require	 adversarial	
school	hearings.		Some	courts	have	found	that	expulsion	from	a	public	
college	is	a	property	deprivation.284		One	decision	by	now-Justice	Amy	
Coney	 Barrett	 noted	 a	 circuit	 split	 on	 property	 deprivation	 in	 these	
circumstances.285	 	That	 court	 found	a	 liberty	deprivation	 in	a	Title	 IX	
case	where	a	student	was	suspended	for	a	year	for	sexual	misconduct	






be	 able	 to	 question	 his	 alleged	 victims;	 school	 administrator’s	 summary	 of	 their	
experiences	is	insufficient).	
















Title	 IX	 due	 process	 requirements.288	 	 Some	 recent	 Sixth	 Circuit	 and	
other	 federal	 appellate	 Title	 IX	 and	 other	 misconduct	 discipline	
decisions	find	that	the	due	process	rights	of	accused	students	in	public	
colleges	 require	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 respondent	 or	 their	 agent	 to	
cross-examine	 the	 victim	 and	 other	 witnesses	 under	 some	
circumstances.289		Other	decisions	hold	that	questioning	by	the	decision-
maker,	after	a	party	has	had	an	opportunity	to	submit	written	questions,	
is	 sufficient,	 similar	 to	 the	 approach	of	 the	new	 regulations	 for	K–12	
schools.290		And	in	contrast	to	the	agency’s	guidance	requiring	unlimited	
cross	 (all	 questions	 on	 cross	 must	 be	 answered	 or	 the	 witness’s	
testimony	 is	 barred),291	 the	 Sixth	 Circuit	most	 recently	 held	 that	 due	
process	does	not	require	a	witness	to	answer	every	question	on	cross.292		
Instead,	the	court	found	that	where	credibility	is	in	dispute,	some	form	
of	 cross	 that	 allowed	 the	 decision-maker	 to	 evaluate	 credibility	 and	
assess	demeanor	was	sufficient	for	due	process,293	noting	that	unlimited	
cross	could	result	 in	harassment	of	a	witness.294	 	One	 federal	appeals	
court	 found	 that	 a	 private	 college’s	 student	 handbook	 language	







college	 that	 provides	 for	 cross-examination	 in	 student	 misconduct	 discipline	 cases	
generally,	in	sexual	assault	case	which	turns	on	credibility,	cross-examination	of	victim	
by	accused	student	or	their	agent	is	required);	Haidak,	933	F.3d	at	69	(finding	that	due	




requires	 cross-examination.	 	Purdue	Univ.,	 928	 F.3d	 at	 664	 n.4.	 	See	 generally	Diane	
Heckman,	 The	 Proliferation	 of	 Title	 IX	 Collegiate	 Mishandling	 Cases	 Involving	 Sexual	
Misconduct	Between	2016–2018:	The	March	to	the	Federal	Circuit	Courts,	358	EDUC.	L.	REP.	















decisions	 extended	 cross-examination	 requirements	 to	 the	makers	of	
documents,	such	as	medical	records	and	academic	transcripts.			
3.		Administrative	Agency	Hearings		









as	business	 records	exempt	 from	the	general	ban	on	hearsay.297	 	The	
Title	 IX	 hearing	 rules	 reject	 this	 approach.	 	 The	 Court,	 however,	 has	
found	a	right	to	cross-examine	adverse	witnesses	in	a	welfare	benefits	






prohibits	 gender	 discrimination	 and	 applies	 to	 both	 males	 and	
females.299	 	 The	 college	 Title	 IX	 cases	 discussed	 above	 address	 only	
alleged	defects	in	process;	they	do	not	reach	the	merits	of	finding	the	
respondent	responsible	for	sexual	misconduct,	nor	make	findings	about	
what	 actual	 Title	 IX	 procedures	 the	 defendant-colleges	 used.300	 	 The	





	 297	 Id.	 at	 403–04	 (noting	 reliability	 of	 medical	 reports);	 id.	 at	 405	 (referring	 to	
admissibility	of	medical	reports	at	trials	although	hearsay).	
	 298	 Goldberg	 v.	 Kelly,	 397	 U.S.	 254,	 268–70	 (1970)	 (determining	 that	 in	 welfare	




	 301	 See,	 e.g.,	Doe	 v.	 Purdue	 Univ.,	 928	 F.3d	 652,	 657–58	 (7th	 Cir.	 2019)	 (alleging	
college	did	not	provide	access	to	evidence,	hearing	panel	determined	complainant	who	






reaction	 overcompensates	 in	 a	 way	 substantially	 unfair	 to	
complainants.		
On	 a	 facial	 level,	 the	 new	 approach	 treats	 complainants	 and	




parties	 themselves	 conduct	 cross-examination	 (perhaps	 remotely)	 to	
minimize	 trauma	 to	 complainants.305	 	 In	 practice	 and	 application,	
however,	 treatment	 is	 not	 equal,	 perhaps	 resulting	 in	 part	 from	 the	
agency’s	 close	work	with	men’s	 rights	 groups	 in	 conceptualizing	 and	
drafting	the	new	regulations.306		A	federal	district	court	recognized	the	
reality	 that	 complainants	 and	 respondents	 are	 not	 treated	 equally,	
noting	that	when	a	respondent	chooses	not	to	testify		
the	hearing	 officer	 is	 prohibited	 from	hearing	 any	 evidence	









Court	 is	 hard	 pressed	 to	 imagine	 how	 a	 complainant	
reasonably	 could	 overcome	 the	 presumption	 of	 non-
responsibility	 to	 attain	 anything	 beyond	 the	 supportive	
measures	 that	 he	 or	 she	 is	 offered	 when	 they	 first	 file	 the	
formal	 complaint.	.	.	.	 	 This	 is	 not	 some	 extreme	 outlier	 or	
fanciful	scenario.307	
Notably,	 the	 new	 regulations	 evince	 a	 conspicuous	 pattern	 of	
borrowing	trial	evidence	approaches,	then	modifying	them	in	ways	that	














clear	 and	 convincing	 burden	 of	 proof	 rather	 than	 the	 normal	 civil	
standard	of	preponderance	of	evidence,308	making	 it	more	difficult	 to	
prove	a	respondent	is	responsible.		Second,	the	regulations	model	their	
newly	 created	 rape	 shield309	 on	 rules	 of	 evidence	 for	 criminal	 trials	
rather	than	the	provisions	for	civil	trials.		But	in	contrast	to	the	criminal	
trial	 provisions,	 it	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 extend	 to	 pattern	 witnesses,	
making	 their	 participation	 more	 difficult	 and	 perhaps	 less	 likely.		
Moreover,	information	protected	by	the	rape	shield	must	be	disclosed	
to	 the	 respondent,	which	 is	 also	 not	 required	 in	 a	 criminal	 trial,	 and	
invades	 the	 privacy	 of	 the	 complainant.	 	 Third,	 the	 requirement	 that	
advisors	 perform	 cross-examination	 rather	 than	 parties310	 seems	
helpful	 to	 protect	 complainants	 from	 retraumatization	 on	 cross-
examination,	but	failure	to	bar	direct	examination	by	parties	means	that,	
for	 example,	 a	 respondent	 could	 call	 a	 complainant	 as	 a	witness	 and	
themself	 conduct	 a	 potentially	 traumatizing	 direct	 examination.	 	 The	
Preamble	 suggests	 school	 policy	 could	 limit	 direct	 examination	 to	
advisors,	 but	 does	 not	 require	 it.311	 	 Fourth,	 the	 complete	 ban	 on	
uncross-examined	 statements312	 goes	 well	 beyond	 the	 hearsay	
exclusion	in	trials	and	even	greatly	exceeds	the	Confrontation	Clause’s	
ban	 on	 prosecutor	 introduction	 of	 hearsay	 against	 actual	 criminal	
defendants.		The	ban	also	ignores	the	reality	that	respondents	are	more	
likely	 to	 have	made	 inculpatory	 statements	 outside	 of	 the	hearing.313		
And	 of	 course,	 that	 ban	 on	 uncross-examined	 statements,	 in	 concert	
with	the	burden	of	proof,	makes	it	difficult	to	prove	responsibility	for	
sexual	misconduct.	 	Fifth,	 the	new	regulations	adopt	some	of	 the	trial	
rules’	 definition	 of	 hearsay,314	 limiting	 it	 to	 assertive	 statements,	 but	
notably	 do	 not	 adopt	 the	 trial	 rules’	 admission	 of	 opposing	 party	
statements,	 allowing	 respondents	 full	 ability	 to	 exclude	 their	
inculpatory	statements,	even	confessions	to	sexual	misconduct.	 	Sixth,	



















help	prove	 the	complainant’s	allegations.317	 	All	of	 this	 information	 is	
shared	with	 both	 parties	 and	 their	 advisors,	with	 no	 ban	 in	 the	 new	








decision-makers	 in	 Title	 IX	 hearings	 often	 will	 not	 be	 judges	 or	
attorneys.320	 	 The	 new	 regulations	 appropriately	 require	 training	 for	
decision-makers	 on	 relevance	 and	 some	 other	 evidentiary	 issues.321		









	 315	 The	privacy	 interests	 and	protections	 in	Title	 IX	 formal	 complaint	matters	 are	







	 321	 See,	 e.g.,	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	 106.45(b)(1)(iii)	 (“[M]aterials	 used	 to	 train	 Title	 IX	
Coordinators,	 investigators,	 decision-makers,	 and	 any	 person	 who	 facilitates	 an	


















IX	 hearings	 that	 would	 be	 admissible	 at	 trial,	 most	 notably	 the	 new	
regulations’	 ban	 on	 uncross-examined	 statements.	 	 The	 Preamble	
indicates	that	the	parties	cannot	waive	this	requirement,326	and	it	is	also	





creation	 of	 the	 ban	 on	 uncross-examined	 statements,	 the	 Preamble	
asserts	that	cross-examination	is	essential	to	ascertainment	of	truth.329		
Cross-examination,	 as	 compared	 to	 other	 impeachment	 techniques,	
does	provide	an	opportunity	to	assess	the	demeanor	of	a	witness.		Some	





examined	 statements.	 	 The	 agency	 posits	 that	 it	 is	 unreasonable	 to	



















its	 hearsay	 or	 other	 status.332	 	 Second,	 the	 requirement	 of	 cross-






the	 statements	 of	 opposing	 parties.	 	 Finally,	 as	 some	 commentators	
suggest,	 the	 decision-maker	 could	 test	 credibility	 by	 inquisitorial	
questioning,	with	an	opportunity	for	parties	to	submit	questions,	rather	
than	adversarial	cross-examination	by	parties	or	their	agents.333	 	This	
last	 approach	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 new	 regulations’	 approach	 to	
resolution	of	formal	complaints	at	K-12	schools.334			
The	agency’s	concern	for	limited	evidentiary	expertise	of	Title	IX	
decision-makers	 is	 also	 undercut	 by	 the	 evidentiary	 issues	 the	 new	
regulations	 require	 decision-makers	 to	 resolve.	 	 Title	 IX	 decision-
makers	must	 resolve	 relevance	 issues.335	 	 Decision-makers	must	 also	
resolve	other	evidence	subtleties,	such	as	whether	evidence	 is	 truly	a	
statement,336	and	thus	inadmissible	hearsay	unless	the	declarant	fully	
submits	 to	 cross-examination;	 whether	 evidence	 is	 protected	 by	 a	
privilege	 and	 if	 so	 whether	 privilege	 has	 been	 waived;337	 whether	
evidence	falls	within	one	of	the	two	exceptions	to	the	rape	shield;338	and	
whether	an	uncross-examined	statement	 is	 relevant	 to	 issues	beyond	
determination	of	responsibility339	and	thus	not	subject	to	the	ban.		And	
in	 these	 and	 other	 instances	 when	 the	 decision-maker	 determines	
evidence	is	irrelevant	and	thus	inadmissible,	the	decision-maker	must	





and	 Harassment:	 The	 Cost	 of	 Excess	 Process	 to	 Victims	 of	 Sexual	 Violence	 on	 College	
Campuses,	95	NOTRE	DAME	L.	REV.	1785,	1807-08	(2020).		This	was	the	approach	taken	in	
earlier	 agency	 guidance,	 since	 rescinded.	 	 U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	EDUC.,	 OFFICE	 FOR	CIVIL	RIGHTS,	
















often	 have	 no	 forensic	 evidence	 or	 eyewitnesses,	 and	 hence	 the	
credibility	 of	 the	 parties	 is	 uniquely	 central.342	 	 The	 new	 regulations	
appropriately	make	clear	that	questions	to	witnesses	about	credibility	
are	 relevant.343	 	 The	 agency	 also	 appropriately	 recognizes	 the	
importance	of	cross-examination	to	assess	credibility.	 	But	it	does	not	
follow	that	cross-examination	 is	required	 for	all	 statements—not	 just	
the	statements	of	parties	but	as	the	agency	suggests,	even	the	makers	of	




used	 techniques	 test	 credibility	 in	 trials:	bias,	 capacity,	 contradiction,	
prior	 inconsistent	 statements,	 and	 character	 for	 truthfulness.346	 	 The	
trial	rules	of	evidence	are	premised	on	a	belief	that	these	impeachment	
techniques	 can	 provide	 a	 fair	 opportunity	 to	 assess	 credibility,	 even	
when	 live	 cross-examination	 is	 not	 available.	 	 Given	 the	 agency’s	
recognition	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 credibility,	 the	 new	 regulations’	
complete	 failure	 to	 address	 these	 fundamental	 impeachment	
techniques,	and	to	offer	guidance	on	admissibility	of	extrinsic	evidence	
to	 impeach	 and	 whether	 such	 evidence	 offered	 for	 impeachment	





















disciplinary	 consequences—up	 to	 and	 including	 expulsion—are	
powerful	incentives	to	participate	and	advocate.		Complainants	decide	
whether	 to	 file	 formal	 complaints,	 but	 in	 some	 cases	 Title	 IX	
Coordinators	 or	 parents	will	 file;	 even	 in	 this	 event,	 the	 complainant	
may	choose	not	to	participate.350		Complainants	who	do	not	file	formal	
complaints,	or	who	do	not	participate,	face	different	consequences	than	
respondents.	 	 Complainants	 do	 not	 face	 discipline	 themselves,	 but	
instead	 risk	 a	 hearing	 outcome	 that	 finds	 the	 respondent	 not	
responsible,	 or	 finds	 the	 respondent	 responsible	 without	 granting	
appropriate	sanctions,	or	does	not	afford	the	complainant	appropriate	
remedies.			
Looking	 at	 the	 Title	 IX	 hearing	 process,351	 and	 the	 admission	 of	
evidence	specifically,	the	disappointing	but	unescapable	reality	is	that	it	
is	 not	 clear	 that	 filing	 a	 formal	 complaint	 is	 a	 good	 option	 for	
complainants.	 	While	the	school	does	the	work	of	gathering	evidence,	
that	 evidence	 involves	 sensitive	 information	 shared	 with	 the	
respondent	 and	 party	 advisors	 without	 a	 regulatory	 ban	 on	 re-
disclosure.352		While	a	rape	shield	bars	admission	of	complainant	sexual	




procedures	 providing	 for	 prompt	 and	 equitable	 resolution	 of	 student	 and	 employee	
complaints	alleging	any	action	which	would	be	prohibited	by	 this	part.”);	 current	34	
C.F.R.	 §	 106.8(c)	 (“Adoption	 of	 grievance	 procedures.	 	 A	 recipient	 must	 adopt	 and	
publish	grievance	procedures	that	provide	for	the	prompt	and	equitable	resolution	of	
student	and	employee	complaints	alleging	any	action	that	would	be	prohibited	by	this	





regulations	 include	 new	 limits	 on	 interim	 relief	 for	 complainants,	 34	 C.F.R.	 §	
106.45(b)(1)(vi);	a	significantly	narrowed	definition	of	sexual	harassment,	§	106.30(a);	
a	higher	standard	for	school	liability,	§§	106.30	and	106.44(a);	dismissal	of	complaints	















and	character	 is	not	protected	by	 the	new	regulations’	 rape	shield.356		
Moreover,	 the	 requirement	of	 consent	 for	 school	 access	 to	 treatment	
records	is	limited	to	parties	and	does	not	include	pattern	witnesses.357			
At	 the	 hearing,	 the	 decision-maker	 cannot	 admit	 statements	 by	
persons	who	do	not	fully	submit	to	cross-examination.		This	exclusion	is	
a	 broad	 one,	 including	 the	 parties’	 own	 statements	 to	 the	 Title	 IX	
investigator	 or	 otherwise,	 witness	 statements,	 statements	 by	 health	
care	 providers	 in	 medical	 records,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 statements	 by	






or	more	 questions,	 be	 deemed	not	 to	 have	 submitted	 fully,	 and	have	
their	 statements	 excluded.361	 	 The	 parties	 can	 keep	 their	 own	
statements,	 even	 a	 confession	 to	 sexual	misconduct	 or	 fabrication	 of	
allegations,	 from	 admission	 at	 the	 hearing	 by	 refusing	 to	 submit	 to	
cross-examination.		Hence,	it	will	often	not	be	clear	even	at	the	outset	of	
a	 hearing	which	 statements	 offered	 by	 a	 party	will	 be	 admitted	 and	

















admission	 of	 evidence	 in	 college	 hearings,	 in	 particular	 limiting	
evidence	 to	 statements	 by	 parties	 and	 other	 persons	who	 have	 fully	
submitted	 to	 live	 cross-examination.	 	 Attorneys	 with	 experience	 in	
school	discipline,	administrative	hearings,	or	civil	or	criminal	trials	will	
find	 a	 very	 different	 approach	 to	 evidence	 in	 Title	 IX	 hearings.		
Complicating	 matters	 further,	 the	 new	 approach	 to	 admissibility	 of	
evidence	 in	 Title	 IX	 hearings	 leaves	 many	 issues	 partially	 or	 fully	










hearings	 and	 decision-makers.	 	 Simply	 put,	 under	 the	 current	
evidentiary	approach	and	its	many	deficiencies,	it	is	not	clear	that	filing	
a	 formal	 complaint	 is	 a	 good	 option	 for	 a	 college	 victim	 of	 sexual	
misconduct.		Wholesale	reconsideration	of	the	evidentiary	approach	of	
the	new	regulations	is	appropriate.			
	
